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Evidence
by John E. Hall, Jr.*
W. Scott Henwood**
and Leesa Guarnotta***
I. INTRODUCTION
In the sixth year since the implementation of Georgia’s new Evidence
Code,1 the Georgia Supreme Court must still remind lower courts and
litigators to rely upon the new Code and its subsequent case law when
addressing evidentiary issues arising after 2013. 2 This Article
highlights some of the continuing changes to Georgia’s evidence rules
based on the new Georgia Evidence Code, Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) Title 24.3 This Article period spans from June 1,
2018 to May 31, 2019. Specifically, this Article addresses: (1) the
consequences of straying from the new Code; (2) new interpretations of
Rule 404(b);4 and (3) reinterpreting what is admissible evidence in
relation to pre-arrest silence, parties as evidence, and identity
testimony in child sexual abuse cases.
*Founding Partner, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A.,
1981); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1984). Member, Mercer Law Review (1982–
1984); Student Writing Editor (1983–1984). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Of Counsel, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State University
(B.B.A., 1976); Woodrow Wilson College of Law (J.D., 1978). Former Reporter of
Decisions, Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Court of Appeals. Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
*** Associate, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State University (B.A.,
2016); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2019). Member, Mercer
Law Review (2017–2019). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. See Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 99 (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 24).
For an analysis of evidence during the prior survey period, see John E. Hall, Jr., W. Scott
Henwood & L. Whit Carmon II, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L.
REV. 97 (2018).
2. Beck v. State, 305 Ga. 383, 386, 825 S.E.2d 184, 186–87 (2019).
3. O.C.G.A. tit. 24 (2019).
4. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b) (2019).
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II. EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING THE NEW CODE
A. Not Applying the New Code
As with most new rules, it will take courts and attorneys time to
adjust to the new Evidence Code. These adjustments do not come
without consequences, as seen in Beck v. State.5 Dallas Beck was
convicted of felony murder, among other crimes, in 2014 after a local
basketball game escalated into a confrontation. One of Beck’s
arguments on appeal was that the jurors considered extrajudicial
information about sentencing, which denied him a fair trial. 6
Eleven jurors testified about the issue at the hearing for a new trial.
Of those eleven, three “testified that the jury discussed sentencing
during deliberations.” Two of those three testified that such discussions
did not affect their verdicts. The third, however, testified that the
discussions did affect the verdict. One of the three jurors denied that
the sentencing information was from another juror, but could not
remember who gave the jury the information or how they got it. The
other eight jurors denied considering sentencing during deliberations.
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, finding that the
sentencing discussions did not affect the verdict and that the one juror
who testified otherwise was not credible given the inconsistencies in her
testimony.7
O.C.G.A. § 24-6-606(b)8 provides that
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . . a juror shall not
testify . . . as to any matter or statement occurring during the course
of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the jury
deliberations . . . concerning the juror’s mental processes in
connection therewith; provided, however, that a juror may testify on
the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the juror’s attention . . . .9

As stated by the Georgia Supreme Court, “The difference between
the old and new Evidence Codes matters in this case.” 10 However, there

5. 305 Ga. 383, 825 S.E.2d 184 (2019).
6. Id. at 383–85, 825 S.E.2d at 184–86.
7. Id. at 385, 825 S.E.2d at 186.
8. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-606(b) (2019).
9. Id.
10. Beck, 305 Ga. at 386, 825 S.E.2d at 187. See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 260 Ga. 640,
643–44, 398 S.E.2d 179, 185 (1990) (holding juror testimony not admissible without
evidence racial bias materially affected the jury’s decision).
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was no mention of Rule 606 in the hearing or the filings associated with
the hearing.11
The supreme court noted that the trial court had evidence with
which it could conclude that extraneous prejudicial information was
introduced to the jury.12 Notwithstanding, the trial court did not make
any findings of whether the juror who testified about information being
given to them was credible.13 Instead, as the supreme court noted, the
trial court relied only on whether the information was prejudicial. 14
However, under Rule 606(b), the juror testimony as to whether the
information was prejudicial is barred.15 Accordingly, the supreme court
vacated the trial court’s denial and remanded the issue for
consideration under Rule 606.16
B. Relying on Cases Decided Before the New Code
Even in cases where the trial court applied the new Evidence Code,
decisions may go awry where the court applies precedent established by
cases prior to 2013, as in Barrett v. Burnette.17 Barrett arose out of a
negligence suit in which Barrett claimed, among other things, that
Burnette was driving under the influence after Barrett hit Burnette’s
parked car. Witnesses and Barrett testified that Burnette’s car was in
the middle of the road without the emergency flashers on. Burnette, on
the other hand, testified that he pulled off the roadway and turned on
the flashers after discovering he had a flat tire. He then walked to his
house to call a wrecker service. About forty-five minutes after the call,
the wrecker service called Burnette about the accident. Burnette rode
with his mother to the accident scene.18
Prior to trial, Burnette moved to exclude evidence of his DUI citation
that was ultimately dismissed and any evidence as to whether he was
legally impaired prior to, during, or after the collision. Although Barrett
did not object to the exclusion of the citation, he argued that testimony
as to Burnette’s blood alcohol level and his and the trooper’s
observations of Burnette’s conduct at the scene should be admissible. In
support of admission, Barrett argued that Burnette was too drunk to
11. Beck, 305 Ga. at 386, 825 S.E.2d at 187.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 387, 825 S.E.2d at 187.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 348 Ga. App. 838, 824 S.E.2d 701 (2019); see also State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 827
S.E.2d 892 (2019), discussed infra note 49.
18. Barrett, 348 Ga. App. at 838, 824 S.E.2d at 702.
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move his car, so he left it in the middle of the road. Burnette countered
by saying he had two beers while home and had not driven for about
forty-five minutes when he returned to the scene.19
The trial court excluded all evidence relating to Burnette’s
intoxication citing that under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403,20 the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the evidence’s probative
value.21 The court had three foundations for its findings: (1) Shelter
Mutual Insurance Company v. Bryant,22 which stated, in that case, “[I]t
may have been a better choice to omit the evidence [of intoxication] due
to its inflammatory nature because of the general public’s appreciation
of the dangers of drinking and driving;” 23 (2) the tenuous probative
value of the positive breath test considering the time Burnette was
away from his car; and (3) the fact that the DUI charge was dismissed. 24
Ultimately, the jury found both Burnette and Barrett 50% at fault. On
appeal, Barrett argued the trial court erred in granting Burnette’s
motion in limine.25
In its opinion, the Georgia Court of Appeals described Rule 403 as an
extraordinary remedy.26 The court went on to explain that “‘the
question of whether a motorist’s consumption of alcohol impaired his
driving capabilities and entered into the proximate cause of the collision
is best left for the jury’s resolution.’” 27 The court then turned to the core
issue of the case—the location of the car—which hinged upon Burnette’s
credibility.28 The court reasoned that since Burnette’s intoxication at
the time of parking was highly relevant, the trial court’s ruling was
overly broad.29 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court’s judgment over Judge Markle’s dissent that the trial court
correctly applied the Rule 403 balancing test. 30 Although Barrett is
physical precedent only,31 it serves to remind courts and attorneys that

19. Id. at 839, 824 S.E.2d at 702–03.
20. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403 (2019).
21. Barrett, 348 Ga. App. at 839, 824 S.E.2d at 703.
22. 220 Ga. App. 526, 469 S.E.2d 792 (1996).
23. Barrett, 348 Ga. App. at 840, 824 S.E.2d at 703.
24. Id. at 840–41, 824 S.E.2d at 703.
25. Id. at 839, 824 S.E.2d at 703.
26. Id. at 840, 824 S.E.2d at 703.
27. Id. (quoting Gwinnett Cty. v. Sargent, 321 Ga. App. 191, 193, 738 S.E.2d 716, 718
(2013)).
28. Id. at 841, 824 S.E.2d at 704.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 842, 824 S.E.2d at 704.
31. Id.
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they should be cautious when relying on cases that applied Georgia’s
old Evidence Code.
III. REINTERPRETING RULE 404(B) EVIDENCE
As both the Federal Rules of Evidence and Georgia’s Evidence Code
continue to develop, there are bound to be some inconsistencies in how
the rules of evidence are interpreted and implemented. These
inconsistencies are exemplified in State v. Atkins.32 Denzel Atkins was
charged with murder, among other crimes, in December 2015 following
a police investigation after a shooting victim, Elijah Wallace, was found
on Fulton County Road. According to Atkins’s accomplice, Harold
Foster, Atkins and Foster borrowed a car to meet Wallace. After Atkins
and Wallace got into an argument in the car, Atkins shot Wallace and
drove a few blocks before dumping Wallace’s body on the roadside. 33
At trial, the State sought to introduce a 2013 Candler County murder
indictment against Atkins to prove intent, motive, identity, and lack of
accident or mistake under Rule 404(b). According to Rasheen Jones, he
and Atkins were going to buy marijuana from Perry Herbert when
Atkins forced Herbert into a vehicle at gunpoint. After some driving,
Atkins forced Herbert out of the vehicle and shot him. Atkins was later
acquitted after denying his presence for the crime.34
The trial court found sufficient proof from which a jury could find
Atkins committed at least some of the prior acts by a preponderance of
the evidence, that there was a legitimate purpose for the other acts
evidence, and that the prejudicial impact of the evidence would not
substantially outweigh any probative value.35 Nevertheless, the trial
court excluded the evidence about Herbert’s murder “out of an
abundance of caution”36 because there was not sufficient evidence
Atkins participated in Herbert’s murder.37

32. 304 Ga. 413, 819 S.E.2d 28 (2018).
33. Id. at 413–14, 819 S.E.2d at 30.
34. Id. at 415, 819 S.E.2d at 30–31.
35. Id. at 422–23, 819 S.E.2d at 35–36.
36. Id. at 423, 819 S.E.2d at 36. The Georgia Supreme Court held exclusion for “an
abundance of caution” was another ground to vacate and remand the trial court’s decision
since it is not one of the enumerated Rule 403 grounds for exclusion. Id.
37. Id. at 415–16, 819 S.E.2d at 31.
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A. Rejecting the Application of Collateral Estoppel to Rule 404(b)
Evidence
In line with the Federal Rules of Evidence, for other acts evidence to
be admissible, Georgia’s Evidence Code requires a trial court to find
that
(1) the other acts evidence is relevant to an issue other than the
defendant’s character, (2) the probative value is not substantially
outweighed by undue prejudice under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403 . . . and (3)
there is sufficient proof that a jury could find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant committed the acts.38

The trial court went beyond these three requirements, implicitly
relying on Moore v. State.39 According to Moore, other acts evidence is
barred where it would relitigate facts from a prior trial. 40
However, as the Georgia Supreme Court noted, in Dowling v. United
States,41 the Supreme Court of the United States expressly declined to
extend collateral estoppel to otherwise admissible other acts evidence
because a lower standard of proof is required.42 Despite Dowling, the
Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court did not err in
relying on Moore at the time of the trial court’s decision. 43 Nevertheless,
the Georgia Supreme Court vacated and remanded the order after
disapproving Moore.44
B. Rejecting the Doctrine of Chances as a Separate Purpose
In addition to seeking to admit the 2013 indictment to prove intent,
motive, identity, and lack of accident or mistake under Rule 404(b), the
State argued the prior act would be admissible under the doctrine of

38. Id. at 416, 819 S.E.2d at 32.
39. 254 Ga. 674, 333 S.E.2d 605 (1985). Moore is based upon the holding of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Ashe v. Swenson, where the Court held that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied in the guarantee against double
jeopardy . . . . “It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once
been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.”
Id. at 675, 333 S.E.2d at 607 (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)).
40. Id. at 675, 333 S.E.2d at 607.
41. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
42. Atkins, 304 Ga. at 420, 819 S.E.2d at 34.
43. Id. at 421, 819 S.E.2d at 35.
44. Id. at 421, 425, 819 S.E.2d at 34–35, 37.
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chances.45 According to the State, “[T]he doctrine of chances is a
legitimate, non-character purpose of Rule 404(b) evidence.”46 The
Georgia Supreme Court disagreed, refusing to endorse the doctrine for
purposes beyond proving intent, knowledge, identity, or lack of accident
or mistake.47
IV. REINTERPRETING “ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE”
A. Pre-Arrest Silence
In State v. Orr,48 the Honorable Justice David Nahmias stated, “[T]he
new Evidence Code . . . precludes courts from promulgating or
perpetuating judge-made exclusionary rules of evidence.”49 It is this
principle that will now allow the admission of a criminal defendant’s
pre-arrest silence based on the facts of the specific case. 50 This
contradicts the previous rule under Mallory v. State,51 which precluded
a criminal defendant’s failure to come forward or silence prior to arrest
since it would always be “far more prejudicial than probative.” 52
Otto Orr was tried for family violence battery and cruelty to children
in 2015 after an argument with his wife ended in Orr striking and
kicking his wife several times in front of their son. At trial, Orr claimed
he acted in self-defense and described his wife as a drug addict who
would attack him when angry. In response, the State questioned
witnesses and Orr as to why Orr never reported the abuse or his
injuries. Orr stated that he was afraid calling the police would cause
the Division of Family and Children Services to “always be involved in
his family’s life.”53
Orr’s attorney did not object to the references of silence until the
State’s closing, but the objection was denied. Ultimately, the jury found
Orr guilty of both charges. With new counsel, Orr filed a motion for new
trial, citing to Mallory. Subsequently, the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that Mallory was valid until the Georgia Supreme Court ruled

45. Id. at 424, 819 S.E.2d at 37. “The doctrine of chances explains . . . that ‘highly
unusual events are highly unlikely to repeat themselves.’” Id. at 423–24, 819 S.E.2d at 36
(quoting United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1991)).
46. Id. at 423, 819 S.E.2d at 36.
47. Id. at 424–25, 819 S.E.2d at 37.
48. 305 Ga. 729, 827 S.E.2d 892 (2019).
49. Id. at 729, 827 S.E.2d at 894.
50. Id. at 739, 827 S.E.2d at 901.
51. 261 Ga. 625, 409 S.E.2d 839 (1991).
52. Id. at 630, 409 S.E.2d at 843.
53. Orr, 305 Ga. at 731, 827 S.E.2d at 895.
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otherwise. Accordingly, the trial court applied Mallory to Orr’s motion
for a new trial. Finding the State’s argument as a harmful violation of
Mallory, the trial court granted Orr a new trial. On appeal by the State,
the court of appeals again held that evidence of pre-arrest silence was
barred by Mallory until the supreme court ruled otherwise.54 The
supreme court granted certiorari on the issue. 55
In its opinion, the supreme court carefully distinguished between the
admissibility of the pre-arrest silence at issue and post-arrest silence.56
The court then explained that, under the old Evidence Code, pre-arrest
silence was admissible, which led to Mallory’s categorical exclusion of
such evidence.57 As noted by the supreme court, Mallory was not based
on the United States Constitution, the Georgia Constitution, the old
Evidence Code, or the common law.58 Rather, the rule was an exercise
of “judicial lawmaking: a rule excluding a certain type of evidence based
on the Court’s view of good policy, operating only prospectively.”59 The
court stated that, as a judicial law, Mallory was abrogated by the new
Evidence Code since the new Code established rules embodying the
risks of prejudice.60 Specifically,
Only one rule, however, authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence
based on the court’s evaluation of the “prejudice” such evidence could
cause: OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”), which grants the trial court
discretion to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue

54. Id. at 731–32, 827 S.E.2d at 895–96.
55. Id. at 732, 827 S.E.2d at 896.
56. Id. at 733, 827 S.E.2d at 896.
[W]hen the government did not induce the defendant to remain silent by
advising him of his right to remain silent as required by Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467–468 . . . and when the defendant then waives his privilege
against compelled self-incrimination by testifying at trial, “the State may
comment at trial upon the fact that he did not come forward voluntarily”
without violating the federal Constitution.
Id. at 733, 827 S.E.2d at 896–97 (quoting Mallory, 261 Ga. at 629, 409 S.E.2d at 842); see
also id. at 733 n.2, 827 S.E.2d at 897 n.2.
57. Id. at 733–34, 827 S.E.2d at 897.
58. Id. at 734, 827 S.E.2d at 897. Since Mallory is not constitutionally required or
required by other law, the court also noted that it does not fall within the exceptions of
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-402 (2019). Id. at 738, 827 S.E.2d at 900.
59. Id. at 735, 827 S.E.2d at 898.
60. Id. at 736–37, 827 S.E.2d at 898–99. “‘[C]ourts are to look to the substantive law
of evidence in Georgia as it existed on December 31, 2012, only when not displaced by the
new code.’” Id. (quoting State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 556, 820 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2018)).
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delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.”61

Further, the court took notice of the fact that, without Mallory,
determining the admissibility of pre-arrest silence will become more
difficult.62 The court cautioned the lower courts from affording such
evidence too much probative value, while also reminding courts of the
extreme nature of exclusion under Rule 403. 63 With the abrogation of
Mallory’s bright-line rule against admission of pre-arrest silence, the
court vacated the decisions of the trial court and the court of appeals
and remanded the case.64
B. Extending the Rule Against Parties as Evidence
As explained in Kesterson v. Jarrett,65 although mental or physical
condition could be presented like any other piece of evidence, parties
themselves cannot.66 There, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
parties may not be excluded based on the physical manifestations of
their injuries.67 This survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals
expanded this principle to controlling how a party presents in the
courtroom beyond physical manifestations of injury.
In Harp v. State,68 Antwain Harp appealed the denial of his motion
for a new trial following his conviction for armed robbery. In addition to
his argument of insufficient evidence, Harp argued that the trial court
abused its discretion when it required him to wear civilian clothing. On
the first day of trial, Harp appeared wearing his National Guard
uniform. After an objection by the State, the trial court prohibited Harp
from wearing his uniform and allowed him to change. 69 Finding no
Georgia case on point, the court relied on State v. Marquez,70 which held
61. Id. at 737, 827 S.E.2d at 899 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403).
62. Id. at 739, 827 S.E.2d at 901. The court also considered possible rules under
which pre-arrest silence would be admissible. Id. at 738–41, 827 S.E.2d at 900–02.
63. Id. at 742–43, 827 S.E.2d at 903.
64. Id. at 739, 743, 827 S.E.2d at 900, 903. The court also advised lower courts in the
future to first determine if the new Evidence Code has abrogated a rule from the former
Code, as the court of appeals had done many times before. Id. at 739–40 n.9, 827 S.E.2d at
900–01 n.9.
65. 291 Ga. 380, 728 S.E.2d 557 (2012).
66. Id. at 392–93, 728 S.E.2d at 566–67.
67. Id. at 394–95, 728 S.E.2d at 568. For a more detailed discussion of Kesterson, see
John E. Hall, Jr., W. Scott Henwood & Alex Battey, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 65 MERCER L. REV. 125 (2013).
68. 347 Ga. App. 610, 820 S.E.2d 449 (2018).
69. Id. at 610–13, 870 S.E.2d at 450–52.
70. 193 P.3d 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
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that “wearing the uniform was an attempt to influence the jury without
introducing evidence or allowing cross-examination.”71
On appeal, the court of appeals determined that no Georgia
precedent was directly on point.72 However, the court distinguished
Carver v. State73 from the present case.74 The court explained that the
witness in Carver was allowed to wear his uniform because his
testimony explained that he was deployed during the time the
defendant believed the witness was stealing from the defendant. 75
Whereas, in the present case, Harp was not subject to
cross-examination, and his service was extraneous to the issues of the
trial.76 Ultimately, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court that
Harp’s uniform “could be construed as an attempt to influence the jury
in a manner not based on witness testimony or other evidence of his
guilt or innocence.”77
C. Identity Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
On occasion, there will be cases where a rule under the new Evidence
Code is, in substance, the same as a rule under the old Evidence Code.
This survey period was the first time the Georgia Supreme Court had to
consider such an occasion.78 While this may seem to be a welcome
occasion to litigators and judges, it can actually make determining
admissibility more difficult where federal case law and state case law
differ in application. The Georgia Supreme Court discussed this
difficulty in State v. Almanza.79
The supreme court granted certiorari to address whether the hearsay
exception under Rule 803(4),80 statements made for the purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment, applies to identifications of alleged
sexual abusers of child victims. 81 Primarily, the court sought to address
the discord between the federal case law, which held such evidence
admissible in certain circumstances, and Georgia case law, which held

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Harp, 347 Ga. App. at 613, 820 S.E.2d at 452 (citing Marquez, 193 P.3d at 581).
Id. at 614, 820 S.E.2d at 452.
324 Ga. App. 422, 750 S.E.2d 735 (2013).
Harp, 347 Ga. App. at 614, 820 S.E.2d at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Almanza, 304 Ga. at 558, 820 S.E.2d at 6.
304 Ga. 553, 820 S.E.2d 1 (2018).
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(4) (2019).
Almanza, 304 Ga. at 553, 820 S.E.2d at 3.
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such evidence inadmissible.82 Ultimately, the court followed federal
precedent and held that “Rule 803(4) permits the admission of identity
in child sexual abuse cases when reasonably pertinent to medical
diagnosis or treatment.”83
In Almanza, the child–victim, Almanza’s stepdaughter, told her
mother that Almanza molested her twice about a year earlier. In turn,
the victim’s mother reported the victim’s accusations to the police,
leading to Almanza’s arrest. At police instruction, the victim’s mother
took the victim to the pediatric emergency room for an exam. The doctor
who treated the victim testified that “he obtained all of his information
from the mother, only questioned the mother, and did not recall the
child saying anything before, during, or after the exam.” In addition,
the victim’s regular pediatrician testified that, at a subsequent
appointment to treat the victim’s viral symptoms, he received all the
information about the alleged molestation from the mother and that the
child did not say anything during the appointment. 84
Prior to Almanza’s trial for “child molestation, incest, aggravated
sexual battery, statutory rape, and aggravated child molestation,” the
State was unable to locate the victim or her mother. 85 This led the State
to file a motion in limine to determine whether the mother’s statements
to both doctors would be admissible. The trial court found any
identification of Almanza as the abuser inadmissible. The court of
appeals affirmed and stated such statements of identity are
categorically inadmissible under Rule 803(4). In its decision, the court
of appeals relied on interpretations of the old Evidence Code’s exception
and United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit precedent
distinguishing causation from attribution of fault, “questioned the
relevance of precedent addressing the admission of identity in child
sexual abuse cases,” and rejected United States v. Renville’s86
admissibility test.87
The Georgia Supreme Court began its opinion by explicitly
referencing the Georgia General Assembly’s intent in enacting the new
Evidence Code to “adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 88 The court held that
Georgia’s old evidence rules should only be considered when addressing

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 554, 820 S.E.2d at 3.
Id. at 554, 820 S.E.2d at 4.
779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
Almanza, 304 Ga. at 554–55, 820 S.E.2d at 4.
Id. at 555, 820 S.E.2d at 4 (quoting 2011 Ga. Laws 99, 100, § 1).
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an issue not covered by the Federal Rules. 89 Therefore, “if a rule in the
new Evidence Code is materially identical to a Federal Rule of
Evidence, we look to federal case law.” 90
Next, the court acknowledged that Rule 803(4) is materially identical
under both Georgia’s old Code and the Federal Rule. 91 In fact, whether
the statements “shall not be excluded”92 or “are not excluded”93 was the
only textual difference.94 The court emphasized that “[t]he fact that the
words of the medical treatment and diagnosis hearsay exception remain
substantively unchanged between the old and new Evidence Code is
inconsequential; because the state rule mirrors Federal Rule 803(4), it
is now read as interpreted by the federal appellate courts.” 95
The court then turned to construe Rule 803(4).96 In doing so, the
court determined that the Eleventh Circuit precedent distinguishing
between statements of causation and fault were not controlling because
they did not declare identification statements as always inadmissible
and did not deal with child sexual abuse cases.97 Without controlling
Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court turned to the Advisory Committee
Notes to Federal Rule 803(4).98 The court took note of the federal
circuit’s exclusion of child sexual abuse cases from the general rule that
identity is relevant only to fault as opposed to medical diagnosis. 99 This
exclusion is premised on the principle that treatment following child
abuse includes treating emotional and psychological injuries, which
often depends on the abuser’s identity. 100 In addition, the identity of the
abuser is necessary to prevent continued physical and emotional
injury.101
Next, the court looked to the Renville test, which requires (1) that the
declarant has the motive to promote treatment in making the statement
and (2) that a physician could reasonably rely upon the statement for
treatment or diagnosis.102 The ultimate goal of the test is to “ensure
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that [a] hearsay statement has a sufficient guarantee of
trustworthiness while excluding statements beyond the scope of the
rule.”103 There is nothing in Rule 803(4) or the Renville test that
prevents a parent from making the statement related to medical
treatment.104
After adopting the Renville test as the Georgia standard and
rejecting the argument that Rule 820 affects Rule 803(4), the court
reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case. 105 Finally, the
court noted other possible barriers to the admission of identifications of
alleged sexual abusers of child victims. 106 Specifically, the court
cautioned about double hearsay, whether a doctor’s visit at the
instruction of police is for the purpose of medical diagnosis, and if police
involvement creates a Confrontation Clause107 issue.108
V. CONCLUSION
As evidenced in this survey period, jurists should be wary when
relying on their previous understanding of Georgia’s old Evidence Code.
However, litigators and judges may take comfort in the fact that they
were given guidance as to how to apply the new Code. As this survey
period shows, federal case law provides ample direction in evidentiary
matters still uncharted by Georgia’s new Code.
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